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Fetal Personhood Laws as Limits to Maternal 
Personhood at Any Stage of Pregnancy: Balancing 
Fetal and Maternal Interests at Post-Viability 
Among Fetal Pain and Fetal Homicide Laws  
Bernice Bird* 
INTRODUCTION 
State fetal personhood laws1 continuously diminish women’s privacy 
rights to terminate or continue pregnancies.  Currently, state governments 
pass both fetal pain and fetal homicide laws that legislate over any stage of 
pregnancy.2  Each type of personhood law, however, unlawfully impacts 
pregnant women’s privacy rights differently.  Most fetal pain laws prohibit 
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 1. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATION, Fetal Homicide Laws, http://www. 
ncsl.org/issues-research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) 
(hereinafter Fetal Homicide Laws).  This paper is limited to the examination of recent 
prosecutions of pregnant women for feticide under state fetal personhood laws enacted as 
fetal homicide and fetal pain laws.  For more analysis on federal fetal personhood laws and 
proposed bills, see Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (2004); 
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2011, S.314, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s314/text (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (failed the 
House vote as H.R. 6099 in the 109th Congress; introduced in the Senate in the 110th 
Congress as S. 356); Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr23/text (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).  For more 
on the prosecution of pregnant women for injury to fetuses under chemical endangerment 
statutes see James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal 
Punishment for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (1991).  Moreover, this 
paper does not analyze the impact of state partial birth abortion legislation in relation to the 
federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act and whether the federal law serves as an additional 
undue burden in the post-viable stage of pregnancy.  For more on this analysis see Anne 
MacLean Massie, So-Called “Partial Birth Abortion Bans:” Bad Medicine? Maybe. Bad 
Law? Definitely!, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 301 (1998); Alissa Schecter, Note, Choosing Balance: 
Congressional Powers and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1987 (2005).   
 2. See Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1; GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, An Overview of 
Abortion Laws, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (hereinafter 
GUTTMACHER). 
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abortions that purportedly cause fetal pain at twenty weeks.3  As pre-viable 
pregnancy regulations, fetal pain laws unconstitutionally infringe on 
women’s right to reproduce without state interference, as reaffirmed in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.4   
As post-viable pregnancy regulations, fetal homicide laws are undue 
burdens5 to women’s right to reproduce because the laws lack maternal life 
and health exceptions precluding maternal prosecution.  Fetal homicide 
laws, though initially created to protect both mothers and fetuses,6 serve to 
wholly protect fetal life and prosecute any perpetrator responsible for fetal 
death, including the mother. 7  Maternal prosecutions associate pregnant 
behaviors with criminal sanctions and, therefore, “hinder”8 the “free 
choice”9 to reproduce.  Accordingly, pregnant women suffer encroachment 
of their liberty interest to continue or terminate pregnancy at all stages of 
pregnancy.  
This paper proposes that state fetal pain and homicide laws should only 
apply to regulating the post-viable stages of pregnancy, while affording 
policy considerations for maternal life, physical and mental health.  Part I 
examines the Supreme Court’s doctrinal shift in defining fetal personhood.  
Section A argues that Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
limited the expansion of fetal personhood rights in protecting women’s 
rights to terminate and continue pregnancies.  Section B asserts that 
Gonzalez v. Carhart expanded the definition of fetal personhood in the 
context of partial birth abortions and thereafter influenced state policy. 
Part II analyzes state fetal personhood laws as overriding maternal 
personhood in the interest of protecting fetal life.  Section A provides an 
overview of fetal pain laws at the state level.  Moreover, Section A argues 
that fetal pain laws are unconstitutional restrictions on the pre-viable stages 
of pregnancy because pregnant women retain their privacy interests prior to 
viability.  Section B discusses fetal homicide laws as undue burdens in the 
post-viable stages of pregnancy because they lack maternal life and health 
exceptions to maternal prosecution.  Part III examines policy change in 
both fetal pain and fetal homicide laws in proposing that fetal personhood 
laws limit their regulations to post-viable stages of pregnancy while 
retaining maternal life and health interests.  Suggestions for policy changes 
include state funding and improvement of mental health facilities, drug 
 
 3. GUTTMACHER, supra note 2. 
 4. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  
 5. Id. at 877. 
 6. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1. 
 7. See Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Jack Elliott, 
Jr., Analysis: Mississippi’s Fetal Homicide Law Gets Court Scrutiny, COMMERCIAL APPEAL 
(Apr. 1, 2013, 7:07 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2013/apr/14/analysis-
mississippis-fetal-homicide-law-gets/. 
 8. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 9. Id.  
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rehabilitation centers, and policies that restrict imprisonment of pregnant 
women for chemical endangerment of fetuses.   
I. U.S. SUPREME COURT ON ABORTION: CHANGING 
DEFINITIONS OF FETAL PERSONHOOD 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s line of abortion cases10 granting women a 
limited privacy right to abortion11 has conceptualized reproductive freedom 
from a pro-choice12 to a pro-life13 context.  In doing so, the Court’s 
doctrinal shift has restructured the definition of fetal personhood.  
A. ROE V. WADE & PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY: LIMITING FETAL 
PERSONHOOD 
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade14 that a Texas 
statute criminalizing abortions was unconstitutional and overbroad, except 
when medically necessary to save the life of the mother.15  The Roe Court 
declared that a woman’s right to terminate or continue a pregnancy was a 
 
 10. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Stenberg v. Carhart, 
530 U.S. 914 (2000); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  This paper limits its 
discussion of Supreme Court rulings on abortion jurisprudence to the aforementioned cases, 
as they pertain to key discussions on fetal personhood set forth in Roe v. Wade.  For more 
Supreme Court rulings on the right to terminate pregnancies, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 326–27 (1980) (upholding Hyde Amendment as a federal restriction for those states 
participating in Medicaid to validly refuse women medically unnecessary abortions); 
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (invalidating Minnesota law requiring notification of both parents and 
waiting period for minor to obtain abortion). 
 11. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.   
 12. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.  
 13. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. 124.  The pro-choice and pro-life rhetoric of the Roe and Casey 
Courts is reflected in both the verbiage used to describe abortion procedures and the 
doctrine.  The pro-life dialogue of the Gonzalez Court is reflected in its choice of words in 
describing partial birth abortions as a way of “killing” fetuses.  See Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 
139.  In a word search excluding headnotes, the Gonzalez Court referred to abortions as a 
method of “killing,” approximately twenty-eight times, while using the term “terminate” six 
times.  Gonzalez, 550 U.S. 124.  In contrast, the Court’s majority opinions in both Roe and 
Casey each used the word “kill” to refer to abortions only one time.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 137; 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 980.  Instead, the Roe and Casey Courts utilized the term “terminate” to 
refer to a woman’s choice to end her pregnancy.  Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (using the term 
“terminate” approximately twelve times, excluding headnotes); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (using 
the term “terminate” approximately thirty-six times, excluding headnotes).   
 14. 410 U.S. 113.  On the same day as Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a Georgia 
statute criminalizing abortions in the companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 179 
(1973).  The Doe Court clarified the health exception to a woman’s right to procure 
abortions.  The Court held that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional in requiring women 
to seek abortions in hospitals, with confirmation of two independent doctors, after approval 
from hospital abortion committees.  Doe, 410 U.S. at 194–201.  In defining the health 
exception to abortions, the Doe Court reasoned “that [] medical judgment may be exercised 
in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s 
age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.  All these factors may relate to health.”  Id. at 
192.  
 15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
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unique privacy right that existed within the Fourteenth Amendment; 
however, the right was not “absolute.”16  Unlike other judicially declared 
privacy rights,17 the state may curtail the privacy right in order to safeguard 
the important interests of promoting the potential life of the unborn child 
and safeguarding the mother’s health.18  That is, a woman maintains the 
privacy right to her bodily integrity and, therefore, a choice to terminate or 
continue a pregnancy, until the point of fetal viability.19   
The Roe Court developed a trimester framework to balance the 
mother’s privacy rights with the state’s interests to protect the health of the 
mother and life of the fetus.20  According to Roe, the mother’s privacy right 
to terminate a pregnancy is narrowly construed to exist between only the 
mother and her consulting physician during the first trimester.21  Therefore, 
the state may not legislate on matters of the womb during the first 
trimester.  During the second trimester, the state may legislate over 
abortion in a manner that is reasonably related to promoting the interest of 
maternal health.22  Finally, the state may prohibit or regulate abortion 
“subsequent to viability,”23 unless abortion is medically necessary to save 
the life and health of the mother.24   
As a result, fetal viability became the definitive line demarcating the 
division between proper state interference and individual privacy 
interests.25  A fetus is viable when it may “potentially live outside the 
mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid,”26 which occurs between twenty-
four and twenty-eight weeks into the pregnancy.27  Therefore, fetal 
personhood is not legally possible under Roe, as the Court interpreted the 
Constitution to grant legal rights to persons already born.28  Fetal 
 
 16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  
 17. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 510 (1925) (extending the privacy right to 
education); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (reasoning the fundamental right to 
marry is within the personal right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 
(1965) (reasoning the personal right to privacy affords a right to contraception within 
married couples).  See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (extending the 
privacy right to unmarried people).   
 18. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.  
 19. Id.  See also Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 989 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[After viability] the 
State’s interest in unborn human life is stealthily downgraded to a merely ‘substantial’ or 
‘profound’ interest . . . .  (That had to be done, of course, since designating the interest as 
‘compelling’ throughout pregnancy would have been, shall we say, a ‘substantial obstacle’   
. . . to reaffirm . . . the ‘central holding’ of Roe.”). 
 20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.  
 21. Id. at 164. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 164–65.   
 25. Id. at 164.  
 26. Id. at 160 (citing LOUIS M. HELLMAN & JACK A. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 
493 (14th ed. 1971); DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1689 (24th ed. 1965)). 
 27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. 
 28. Id. at 157.   
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personhood could not logically and legally coexist with the right to 
terminate pregnancies.29  “If this suggestion of personhood is established, 
the . . . case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be 
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”30  In recognizing 
fetal personhood, the state could prosecute women who procure abortions 
on the grounds of feticide. 
In 1992, the Court reaffirmed the “essential holding”31 of Roe in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, while 
abolishing the trimester framework.32  The Casey Court held that the 
following provisions of a Pennsylvania statute were not an undue burden to 
the right to terminate a pregnancy: (1) the medical emergency definition;33 
(2) the requirement of informed consent within a twenty-four hour waiting 
period;34 (3) the parental consent provision for unemancipated minors,35 
and (4) the medical recordkeeping provision.36  However, the Court 
reasoned that the spousal notification provision was an undue burden to 
women seeking abortions because domestic violence influenced women’s 
reproductive choices.37  
According to Casey, women have the right to “choose to have an 
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from 
the State.”38  An “undue burden” was defined as any “regulation . . . [that] 
plac[ed] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus.”39  Moreover, the Court reasoned that “the means 
chosen by the state to further the interest in potential life must be calculated 
to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”40  Therefore, an undue 
burden serves to hinder a woman’s free choice to terminate or, as its legal 




 29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157–58. 
 30. Id. at 156–57.  
 31. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 880 (reasoning that the definition of medical emergency as posing a “serious 
risk” to the mother’s health was sufficiently broad enough and did not act as an undue 
burden).  
 34. Id. at 881 (reasoning that requiring informed consent within twenty four hours for 
physician to inform women of the nature of the procedure and gestational age of the unborn 
child is not a substantial undue burden of delay, cost or risk).  
 35. Id. at 899 (reasoning that, except in a medical emergency, the judicial bypass 
provision allowing minors to seek abortions without parental consent upon a finding of 
capacity and maturity, if the abortion is in the minor’s best interests, was not an undue 
burden).  
 36. Id. at 900–01 (reasoning that maintaining medical records on demographic data of 
abortion procedures was necessary for health interests and medical research).   
 37. Id. at 894.  
 38. Id. at 846. 
 39. Id. at 877. 
 40. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Court enumerated that the holding contained three parts:  
First[, there] is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to 
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue 
interference from the State. Before viability, the State’s interests 
are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the 
imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right 
to elect the procedure.  Second[, there] is a confirmation of the 
State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law 
contains exceptions for pregnancies[,] which endanger the 
woman’s life or health.  And third[, there] is the principle that the 
State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in 
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that 
may become a child.41 
In upholding the key premises of Roe, the Casey Court incorporated the 
Roe Court’s rejection of fetal personhood, as it would abridge a woman’s 
right to terminate and, likewise, continue her pregnancy.  The right to 
terminate pregnancy is based on the fundamental liberty to use 
contraception,42 which includes the choice to terminate pregnancy, use 
contraception, or forego either and, instead, continue the pregnancy and 
raise the “human life that results.”43  The Casey Court, in its dicta, sought 
to protect these privacy rights as part of a woman’s liberty interest to 
“control . . . her [own] destiny.”44  Moreover, the Court emphasized that 
fetuses cannot “override the rights of the woman”45 until the point of 
viability thereby further addressing the need of privacy protection, at least 
during the pre-viable stages of pregnancy.  
Therefore, the Casey Court restricted state regulation on all pregnant 
women in the pre-viable stages, rather than limiting its opinion to pregnant 
women choosing to terminate their pregnancies.  Without directly 
addressing fetal personhood, Casey established that prior to viability, 
pregnant women are entitled to continue or terminate their pregnancy 
without state restriction.  
B.  GONZALEZ V. CARHART: EXPANDING FETAL PERSONHOOD 
In 2007, however, the Court confused legal scholars46 by “blur[ring] 
the lines, firmly drawn in Casey,”47 on the application of the health 
 
 41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 42. Id. at 852–53 (relying on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 538 (1972)). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 869.  
 45. Id. at 870.  
 46. See Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to 
Refuse Medical Treatment after Gonzalez v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 147–53 
(2010); Michael C. Dorf, Abortion Rights, 23 TOURO. L. REV. 815, 822–24 (2008). 
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exception to “partial birth abortions.”48  The Court upheld the Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“PBABA”) in Gonzalez v. Carhart,49 reasoning 
that its absence of a health exception did not pose an undue burden as a 
federal restriction of “partial birth abortions”50 upon fetal viability.51  The 
PBABA prohibited practitioners from “knowingly perform[ing] a partial-
birth abortion . . . that is [not] necessary to save the life of a mother.”52   
The Court declared that federal restrictions to partial birth abortions 
could exist without a health exception for women, contrary to Casey, 
because there remained a significant medical uncertainty as to the health 
benefits of dilation and evacuation procedures in later term pregnancies.53  
Primarily, the medical uncertainty surrounding the benefits54 of these 
abortion procedures served to justify the federal restriction as reasonable, 
rather than undue.55  Moreover, the Court reasoned that it could not 
interpret Casey’s health exception as to allow medical professionals to 
perform any abortion procedures at their discretion.56  Rather, the state had 
an interest to regulate the medical profession insofar as to protect the 
profession from suffering a negative public perception on the “appropriate 
role of a physician during the delivery process, [because partial birth 
 
 47. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 48. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 147.  “Partial birth” abortions are commonly referred in the 
medical community as “intact dilation and evacuation” or “dilation and extraction” 
procedures.  Id. at 170 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  For an explanation on the “dilation 
and extraction” and “intact dilation and evacuation procedures,” see Stenberg v. Carhart, 
530 U.S. 914, 915 (2000).  
 49. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 147.  Seven years earlier in 2000, the Court heard Stenberg v. 
Carhart, in which the Court reviewed a Nebraska statute criminalizing “partial birth 
abortions” without an exception to safeguard the health of women.  Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 
921.  The Court invalidated the statute because of the absence of the health exception, as the 
statute posed an undue burden to reproductive freedom.  Id.  As a result of the Stenberg 
decision, approximately thirty states declared their partial birth abortion bans unenforceable.  
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-key-
abortion-rulings-of-the-us-supreme-court/ (hereinafter “PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC 
LIFE”). 
 50. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 147.  Approximately nineteen states prohibit partial birth 
abortions in the pre-viable and post-viable stages of pregnancy.  See GUTTMACHER, supra 
note 2.  Three of these states only implement post-viable restrictions to partial birth 
abortions.  Id.  Incidentally, the government of El Salvador prohibits abortions, even at the 
cost of saving the life of the mother.  Jodi Jacobson, Women’s Rights Groups Demand 
Immediate Action for El Salvadoran Woman in Need of Life-Saving Abortion (Apr. 25, 
2013, 4:05 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/04/25/womens-rights-groups-demand 
-immediate-action-for-el-salvadoran-woman-in-need-of-life-saving-abortion/.  
 51. See Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 147.   
 52. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 124. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2006)).   
 53. Id. at 158.  
 54. Id. at 166–67 (stating that the statute was not invalid particularly when there were 
other methods of abortion available for women in the second trimester).  
 55. Id. at 158.  
 56. Id.  
BIRD FINAL TO PRINT 10.29 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2013  1:19 PM 
46 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1 
abortion procedures] pervert[] a process during which life is brought into 
the world.”57  
Unlike the past key decisions on abortion, the Gonzalez Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice Kennedy, emphasized the states’ interest to 
safeguard and promote the “respect of human life.”58  The Court reasoned 
that the PBABA was constitutional because it prohibited “a method of 
abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before completion of the birth 
process.”59  Furthermore, the Court deferred to legislative history that 
“implicitly approving such a[n] . . . inhumane procedure . . . will further 
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable 
and innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such 
life.”60  The Court expressed that “[dilation and evacuation] is a procedure 
itself laden with the power to devalue human life.”61  
Moreover, the Gonzalez Court strengthened the argument for fetal 
personhood laws in writing that the PBABA “appl[ied] [to] both pre-
viability and post-viability because, by common understanding and 
scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, 
whether or not it is viable outside the womb.”62  In the reasoning, the Court 
constructively reversed the mandates of Casey in announcing personhood 
rights to pre-viable fetuses.  Furthermore, Gonzalez interpreted the state’s 
power to regulate reproductive freedom for the interest of “promot[ing] 
respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy,”63 contrary to Roe and 
Casey.  Specifically, “the government has a legitimate and substantial 
interest in preserving and promoting fetal life.”64  Finally, the Gonzalez 
holding resulted in the judicial approval of state legislatures to create 
abortion policy, without regard to medical findings.65   
II. FETAL PERSONHOOD ENCROACHING ON ALL STAGES 
OF PREGNANCY 
After Roe v. Wade, many state legislatures enacted fetal personhood 
laws as a challenge to the reproductive right to terminate a pregnancy.66  In 
 
 57. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 160.  
 58. Id. at 159.  
 59. Id. at 157.  
 60. Id. at 157 (citing to Congressional Findings ¶ (14)(N)). 
 61. Id. at 158.  The Court cites at length the Congressional record in stating that the 
prohibited abortion methods under the Act had a “disturbing similarity to the killing of a 
newborn infant.”  Id. (citing Congressional Findings ¶ (14)(L)). 
 62. Id. at 147. (emphasis added).  
 63. Id. at 163. (emphasis added).  
 64. Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 145.  
 65. Id. at 129.  (“Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power 
in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.”) 
 66. James MacPherson, North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill Passes House, Sent to Governor 
Jack Dalrymple, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://www.huffington 
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particular, fetal pain laws became ubiquitous among the states after 
Gonzalez v. Carhart.67  Most fetal pain laws prohibit abortions as early as 
twenty weeks.68  These laws unconstitutionally regulate the pre-viable 
stages of pregnancy and infringe on women’s privacy.   
Various fetal homicide laws were also the states’ response to Roe v. 
Wade.69  State legislatures enacted fetal homicide laws, also known as 
“unborn victims of violence”70 laws, with the legislative intent of 
protecting both the mother and unborn child.71  Most commonly, states 
prosecuted third party assailants for injury or death to the unborn child.72  
However, chemical endangerment laws also served as means to prosecute 
mothers73 for feticide.  At post-viability, fetal homicide laws act as undue 
burdens on reproductive freedom because the laws prosecute pregnant 
women without affording maternal life or health exceptions for policy 
considerations.  
Ultimately, state governments overreach their powers and restrict both 
a woman’s right to terminate and continue her pregnancy at all stages of 
pregnancy.  This section examines (1) fetal pain laws; and, (2) fetal 
homicide laws at the state level. 
A.  STATE FETAL PAIN LAWS 
The fetal pain laws are unconstitutional pre-viable restrictions on 
women’s rights to terminate and continue pregnancies.  Moreover, the laws 
constructively serve as the states’ effort to coerce female citizens to 
continue pregnancies.  
1. Overview 
Although the medical and legislative research is still in substantial 
disagreement on whether fetuses feel pain upon administration of stimuli at 
twenty weeks,74  Gonzalez v. Carhart has “emboldened”75 state legislatures 
 
post.com/2013/04/12/north-dakota-fetal-pain_n_3071760.html (hereinafter North Dakota 
Fetal Pain Bill). 
 67. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 49. 
 68. GUTTMACHER, supra note 2.  
 69. North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill, supra note 66. 
 70. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1. 
 71. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.  
 72. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.  
 73. Marie Diamond, Pregnant Women Who Lose Babies Face Criminal Charges in 
Mississippi, Alabama, (July 1, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/07/01/ 
256823/pregnant-women-criminal-charges/.  See also NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT 
WOMEN, Truthout Covers NAPW and Our Cases, June 2012 Archives, (June 15, 2012), 
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2012/06/ (hereinafter NAPW). 
 74. Denise Grady, Study Finds 29-Week Fetuses Probably Feel No Pain and Need No 
Anesthesia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/health/ 
24fetus.html?_r=0; Texas: Pro-Life Side Wins Debate Over Fetal-Pain Abortion Ban, Mar. 
18, 2013, http://www.lifenews.com/2013/04/18/texas-pro-life-side-wins-debate-over-fetal-
pain-abortion-ban/.  
 75. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 49. 
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to pass restrictive reproductive laws.  As of 2013, forty-one states prohibit 
abortion upon fetal viability, unless to save the life or health of the 
mother.76  However, several states prohibit abortions during the pre-
viability stage of pregnancy in contradiction to Casey and Roe.  For 
instance, Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Louisiana, 
and North Carolina prohibit abortions at twenty weeks into the pregnancy, 
except for the life or health of the mother.77  These states prohibit abortions 
at twenty weeks on the theory that fetuses experience pain from abortions.78   
In March of 2013, North Dakota, the state with the “toughest 
restrictions on abortion in the country,”79 signed into law a “fetal heartbeat 
bill” banning abortions six weeks into pregnancy upon detection of a fetal 
heartbeat.80  Notably, North Dakota has also passed a “fetal pain” bill on all 
abortions twenty weeks into pregnancy on the premise that fetuses feel pain 
at twenty weeks.81  Additionally, if ratified by the voters in the November 
2014 election, North Dakota could become the first state to pass a “fetal 
personhood amendment” to its State Constitution so that a fertilized egg 
has the same right to life as any living person.82   
2. Pre-Viable Fetal Pain Laws: Unconstitutional State Interference in 
Women’s Privacy 
The fetal pain bans on pre-viable abortions unlawfully infringe on the 
privacy interests of pregnant mothers.  The state’s interest to protect fetal 
pain has expanded the state’s reach into the pre-viable stages of pregnancy 
against women’s right to privacy set forth in both Casey and Roe.  A 
careful reading of Gonzalez, and the states’ reproductive policies that 
followed, would lead to the conclusion that states have the authority to 
legislate on reproductive rights in the absence of medical certainty.83  
Moreover, unlike Casey and Roe, the Court in Gonzalez explicitly stated 
that state governments have an interest to “promote respect for human life 
at all stages in the pregnancy[.]”84  Thus, states have the legal basis to 
legislate during pre-viability in the absence of medical certainty in the 
interest of fetal life, despite its detrimental consequences to women’s 
privacy rights.   
 
 76. GUTTMACHER, supra note 2.  
 77. GUTTMACHER, supra note 2.  
 78. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 49.  
 79. Mira Oberman, North Dakota Now Has the Toughest Restrictions in the Country, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/north-
dakota-introduces-toughest-abortion-laws-in-the-country-2013-3.   
 80. North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill, supra note 66. 
 81. North Dakota Fetal Pain Bill, supra note 66.  
 82. Oberman, supra note 79.  
 83. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 129 (2007).  (“Medical uncertainty does not 
foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in 
other contexts.”) 
 84. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).  
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The fetal pain laws dilute both the choices to terminate pregnancy and 
continue a pregnancy.  Particularly, the pre-viable fetal pain laws serve as 
pieces of moral legislation for the state to deter abortions.  If a pregnant 
woman cannot seek an abortion prior to twenty weeks, contrary to Casey, 
then the state has effectively removed her choice to continue her 
pregnancy.  Rather, she must either carry to term or travel to a favorable 
jurisdiction.  Travel, however, is expensive for many women and may 
prove burdensome, especially if in a state with only one abortion clinic.85  
Moreover, the fetal pain laws may have a discriminatory impact on women 
of lower socioeconomic status.  Women of lower socioeconomic means 
may lack the education to understand that fetal pain is not empirically 
validated.  As a result of constructive state coercion, many women will 
refuse an abortion and continue their pregnancies, even if their social 
circumstances are undesirable, because they empathize with their fetuses.  
Furthermore, the states’ estimated assumptions that a fetus can 
experience pain prior to viability is irrelevant, given that Roe clearly sets 
forth that unborn children have no legal rights under the Constitution.86  As 
Roe reasoned, if fetuses had a legal right to life and personhood, then states 
and courts could proscribe their mothers’ rights to abortions altogether.87  
Although Casey’s dicta states that, subsequent to viability, an unborn 
child’s interest could “override the rights of the woman,”88 this does not 
further the state’s interest to regulate pre-viable pregnancies.  If anything, 
Casey’s dicta may provide states a legal basis to create fetal protection laws 
in the post-viable stages of pregnancy, while remaining limited to the 
health and life needs of the mother.  Thus, if broadly construed, a fetus’s 
“personhood” is as limited as its mother’s, while in the womb.  However, 
current fetal personhood laws are so burdensome as to deter women’s “free 
choice”89 to reproduce in regulating both the pre-viable stages and post-
viable stages of pregnancy without maternal life or health exceptions.  
B.  STATE FETAL HOMICIDE LAWS 
Under fetal homicide laws, various states have prosecuted pregnant 
women for behavior resulting in the deaths of their unborn children.90  
Although fetal homicide laws enable states to regulate “any stage of 
 
 85. See Sarah Kliff, North Dakota’s Only Abortion Clinic Isn’t Going Anywhere, 
WASHINGTON POST, (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp 
/2013/04/02/north-dakotas-only-abortion-clinic-isnt-going-anywhere/; Campbell Robertson, 
Judge Prevents Closing of Mississippi’s Sole Abortion Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/ruling-prevents-closing-of-mississippis-only-aborti 
on-clinic.html?_r=1&.  
 86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–58 (1973). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).  
 89. Id. at 877. 
 90. See Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. App. 2012); Elliott, supra note 7.   
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pregnancy,”91 most legal challenges involve women who have lost 
pregnancies in the post-viable stages of pregnancy.  At post-viability, fetal 
homicide laws pose as invalid, undue burdens on women’s choices to 
continue pregnancies because the laws lack maternal life or health 
exceptions for state policy considerations precluding maternal prosecution.  
Rather, the fear of criminal sanctions related to pregnancy-based behaviors 
causing feticide influences women’s reproductive freedom.   
1. Overview 
States have enacted fetal homicide laws for the legislative purpose of 
protecting both mothers and their unborn children from the acts of third 
parties.92  Since the 1970s, various courts have determined that viable 
fetuses were human beings and were entitled to legal protection. 93  In total, 
38 states have enacted fetal homicide laws, while twenty-three of them 
regulate “any stage of gestation”94 from “conception to live birth.”95  
Eleven states explicitly preclude prosecution of legal abortion under the 
fetal homicide laws.96   
Pro-choice advocates argue that fetal personhood laws grant unborn 
children fetal personhood rights that may criminalize pregnant mothers’ 
behavior that results in miscarriages or stillbirths, such as substance 
abuse.97  Rather, state legislatures should only protect pregnant mothers and 
punish their assailants.98  Moreover, the fetal homicide laws serve to create 
 
 91. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.  
 92. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.  
 93. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 628 (1970) (rejecting the “born alive” 
rule in order to accommodate fetuses as protected class under California’s murder statute); 
contra Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219 (1977) (rejecting application of 
child endangerment statute to unborn fetus in prosecution of mother ingesting heroin while 
pregnant causing twins’ heroin addiction); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 
(Mass. 1984) (applying viable fetuses to vehicular homicide statute); State v. Horne, 319 
S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 735 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); 
State ex rel. Angela M. W. v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).  As 
early as the 1300s, the common law enabled prosecution for infanticide; however, the 
common law did not recognize fetal homicide per se.  Joanne Pedone, Filling the Void: 
Model Legislation for Fetal Homicide Crimes, 43 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 77, 80. 
(2009).  Rather, a plaintiff had to establish that the infant was “born alive” and subsequently 
died as a result of third-party injuries while in utero.  Id. at 81. 
 94. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1 (listing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5419). 
 95. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1 (listing MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37).  The list of 
states that regulate pregnancy in the pre-viable and post-viable stages are Alabama, Arizona, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See supra.    
 96. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1. The following states explicitly preclude 
punishment of abortion under their fetal homicide laws: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.  See supra.   
 97. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1.  
 98. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1. 
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an adversarial relationship between the fetus and mother.99  Pro-life 
advocates assert, however, that the state has an interest to safeguard both 
the fetus and mother from violent acts.100  
In general, states have used fetal homicide laws against women in the 
interest of promoting, and seeking retribution for, fetal life.  States with 
chemical endangerment laws have recently prosecuted women under these 
laws as vehicles to prosecute for fetal homicide.101  The defendant-mothers’ 
profiles paint a picture of mentally infirm or drug dependent women who 
are victims of the states’ political agendas to eradicate drugs and abortion.   
In 2006, the State of Mississippi charged its first defendant, fifteen-
year-old Rennie Gibbs with depraved heart murder for the stillbirth of her 
thirty-six week-old fetus on the theory that her cocaine habit caused its 
death.102  As an adolescent, Gibbs faces a life sentence for the stillbirth.103  
In an amicus brief in support of Gibbs to the Mississippi Supreme Court in 
2012, a myriad of public health professionals and the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Mississippi argued that “[s]uch prosecutions deter 
pregnant women from seeking prenatal care and drug and alcohol 
treatment.”104  Moreover, amici argued that maternal prosecutions could 
potentially encourage termination of pregnancies among women struggling 
with drug dependency as an avenue to avoid criminal penalties.105   
Additionally, in 2010, the State of Mississippi prosecuted Nina 
Buckwalter for manslaughter when she delivered a stillborn.106  The State 
alleged that her illicit drug use demonstrated “callous disregard for life”107 
thereby causing the stillbirth.  The circuit judge dismissed the case 
reasoning that the state legislature did not intend to criminalize pregnant 
women’s actions.108  However, the case was appealed to the Mississippi 
Supreme Court.109  Four similar cases are pending in the court system on 
whether women are criminally culpable for the deaths of their fetuses.110 
 
 99. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1. 
 100. Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1. 
 101. Elliott, supra note 7. 
 102. Ed Pilkington, Outcry in America as Pregnant Women Who Lose Babies Face 
Murder Charges, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 24, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://m.guardiannews.com/ 
world/2011/jun/24/america-pregnant-women-murder-charges. For a list of Mississippi’s 
fetal homicide laws, see Fetal Homicide Laws, supra note 1. 
 103. Pilkington, supra note 102. 
 104. Brief for Nat’l Ass’n Soc. Workers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, 
Gibbs v. State, No. 2010-M-819, available at http://www.socialworkers.org/assets/secured/ 
documents/ldf/briefDocuments/Gibbs%20v%20State%20MS%20Sup.Ct.Amicus%20Brief.
pdf. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Elliott, supra note 7.  
 107. Elliott, supra note 7.  
 108. Elliott, supra note 7.  
 109. Elliott, supra note 7.  
 110. Elliott, supra note 7.  
BIRD FINAL TO PRINT 10.29 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2013  1:19 PM 
52 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1 
Alabama also introduced the Chemical Endangerment Act of 2006 to 
protect children from exposure to their parents’ use and manufacture of 
methamphetamines.111  The State prosecuted Amanda Kimbrough for the 
stillbirth of her premature child, alleging that the baby’s death was the 
result of her drug use during pregnancy.112  Kimbrough struggled with drug 
dependency113 and chose to continue her pregnancy, nonetheless.114  
Kimbrough reported that she was dependent on methamphetamine after her 
first marriage.115  During her pregnancy, Kimbrough had refused 
prescription medication for the health of the unborn child, primarily 
because the fetus had already developed various medical complications, 
such as a prolapsed cord.116  Kimbrough’s physician had diagnosed her 
unborn child with Down Syndrome and had recommended an abortion, 
which she refused.117  She stated in an interview that, in a moment of 
weakness, she had used “meth only once” while pregnant with her now 
deceased child.118  Although the State charged her with murder relating to 
drug use, the prosecutor did not charge her with drug possession.119  She 
received a minimum sentence of ten years after reaching a plea bargain 
with the State.120  As of 2006, sixty women have been prosecuted for drug 
dependency under this law.121   
Finally, in 2011, the State of Indiana prosecuted Bei Bei Shuai for the 
death of her fetus resulting from her attempted suicide.122  Shuai ingested 
rat poison, while thirty-three weeks pregnant, after her fiancé had 
abandoned her.123  A friend rushed her to the hospital where she was treated 
and hospitalized for a month, and the baby was delivered via Caesarean 
 
 111. Pilkington, supra note 102.  See also NAPW, supra note 73. 
 112. Pilkington, supra note 102. 
 113. Ada Calhoun, The Criminalization of Bad Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-badmothers.html? 
Pagewanted=all&_r=0.   
 114. Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, A Pregnant Woman Is Not a Meth Lab, ACLU BLOG OF 
RIGHTS (July 6, 2010, 5:12 pm), http://www.aclu.org/blog/reproductive-freedom/pregnant-
woman-not-meth-lab.  
 115. Calhoun, supra note 113.   
 116. Calhoun, supra note 113. 
 117. Calhoun, supra note 113.  
 118. Calhoun, supra note 113.  
 119. Kolbi-Molinas, supra note 114.  
 120. Calhoun, supra note 113. 
 121. Calhoun, supra note 113.  See also Debra Cassens Weiss, Drug Abusing Pregnant 
Women Under Endangerment Law, Ala. Supreme Court Says, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 14, 2013, 
6:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/unborn_children_are_protected_by_ che 
mical_endangerment_law_alabama_supreme/ (reporting that the Alabama Supreme Court 
upheld maternal prosecutions under the chemical endangerment law). 
 122. Laura Wilkerson, Woman Charged With Murder After Suicide Attempt, OPEN SALON 
(Mar. 17, 2011, 7:43 AM), http://open.salon.com/blog/laura_wilkerson/2011/03/17/woman_ 
charged_with_murder_after_suicide_attempt.   
 123. Id.   
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section.124  However, her baby died a week later.125  The prosecutor’s office 
in Indiana charged her under the murder and fetal homicide statutes for 
harm caused to the fetus in utero and its subsequent death upon delivery.126  
The case of Bei Bei Shuai was one of first impression for the Court of 
Appeals of Indiana, given that it had not ruled on whether the State could 
lawfully prosecute a mother under the fetal homicide statute.127  The court 
relied on Herron v. State where the State had prosecuted a mother for her 
cocaine use while pregnant because of the physical effects on the child 
after delivery.128  In Herron, the court declined to uphold the prosecution of 
the defendant-mother for her cocaine use while pregnant under the 
dependency statute because the statute did not recognize unborn children as 
a protected class.129  In contrast, the Bei Bei Shuai court determined that the 
state legislature had explicitly classified unborn children as “persons” in its 
fetal homicide statute.130  Therefore, the court reasoned that the State could 
justifiably prosecute on behalf of Bei Bei Shuai’s deceased child under 
both the murder and fetal homicide laws.131  
As of 2013, Bei Bei Shuai served over a year in prison and she was 
released on bond following an appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals.132  
Shuai’s case was set for trial in September when the parties reached a plea 
agreement on August 2.133  The prosecutor dropped the charges of feticide 
and murder, and Shuai pleaded guilty to criminal recklessness and was 
sentenced to time served of 178 days.134  
2. Unduly Burdensome Post-Viable Fetal Homicide Laws: No Health 
or Life Exceptions to Maternal Prosecution 
The current fetal homicide laws run contrary to Casey’s guidelines for 
maternal health and life exceptions to state regulation of post-viable 
pregnancy.  Maternal prosecutions are in the sole interest of the fetus and 
are not in the best health or life interests of the unborn child and mother.  
As a result, the presence of fetal homicide laws “hinder”135 women’s “free 
 
 124. Wilkerson, supra note 122. 
 125. Wilkerson, supra note 122.  
 126. Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. App. 2012).  
 127. Bei Bei Shuai, 966 N.E.2d  at 628. 
 128. Id. (citing Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. App. 2000)). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 629.  
 131. Id. at 628.  
 132. “I was scared”: Woman Accused of Killing Her Unborn Baby by Drinking Rat 
Poison Speaks out Ahead of Murder Trial as Her Lawyer Insists it was Suicide Attempt, 
MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 25, 2013, 8:32 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2315028/Bei-Bei-Shuai-Woman-accused-killing-unborn-baby-drinking-rat-poison-speaks 
ahead-murder-trial-lawyer-insists-suicide-attempt.html.  
 133. Bei Bei Shuai Pleads Guilty in Baby’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2013, 7:18 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/02/bei-bei-shuai-guilty_n_3698383.html. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
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choice”136 to terminate or continue pregnancies because of the threat of 
criminal sanctions. 
Prosecuting mothers who suffer stillbirths or miscarriages as a result of 
drug dependency or mental health disorders is against public policy.  Such 
status-based prosecutions trigger mental health distress, which exacerbates 
the risk of drug relapse or an underlying mental health condition, and leads 
to a likelihood of prosecution.137  Ultimately, the threat of prosecution does 
not deter the behavior—it worsens the punishable offense.  Moreover, the 
subsequent imprisonment will separate the mother from any other existing 
children, which injures the psychological bonds within existing family 
units.138  If the states desire a decrease in drug dependency and increase in 
positive parenting, then the prosecution of at-risk mothers is likely to have 
the opposite effect.   
In 2010, the National Institute on Healthcare Management published 
that ten percent to twenty percent of women suffer maternal depression 
during pregnancy or within the first twelve months after delivery.139  
Various peer-reviewed studies have confirmed these findings and have 
added that maternal anxiety and depression are most common among 
pregnant women with histories of mental health disorders.140  Policy 
arguments are abound in showing that strengthening the mental health of 
at-risk pregnant women, rather than punishing them, will enhance the 
potential lives of unborn children, while respecting women’s personhood.  
At post-viability, the fetal homicide laws make pregnant women a 
“special class of persons”141 whose pregnancy status permits overreaching 
state scrutiny.  For example, in Mississippi, possession of cocaine, or any 
derivative thereof, yields a prison sentence from a year142 up to a maximum 
of thirty years,143 dependent on the weight of the substance in possession.  
However, as the prosecution of Rennie Gibbs144 demonstrates, a pregnant 
 
 136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.  
 137. Lynn M. Paltrow, Criminal Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women, REPRODUCTIVE 
FREEDOM PROJECT (April 1992), http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles /19 
92stat.htm. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Identifying and Treating Maternal Depression: Strategies & Considerations for 
Health Plans, NAT’L INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT FOUNDATION, 
http://nihcm.org/pdf/FINAL_MaternalDepression6-7.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
 140. Pregnancy and Mental Health, STANFORD SCHOOL OF MEDICINE: CENTER FOR 
NEUROSCIENCE & WOMEN’S HEALTH, http://womensneuroscience.stanford.edu/wellness_ 
clinic/Pregnancy.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2013); Psychiatric Disorders During Pregnancy, 
MASS. GENERAL HOSPITAL: MGH CENTER FOR WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH, http://www. wo 
mensmentalhealth.org/specialty-clinics/psychiatric-disorders-during-pregnancy/ (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2013).   
 141. National Advocates for Pregnant Women in the New York Times Magazine, THE 
OVERBROOK FOUNDATION (May 4, 2012), http://www.overbrook.org/2012/05/04/national-
advocates-for-pregnant-women-in-the-new-york-times-magazine/.  
 142. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(c)(1)(A) (2006) (less than one tenth of a gram). 
 143. Id. § 41-29-139(c)(1)(E) (thirty grams). 
 144. Pilkington, supra note 102. 
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woman in Mississippi can face life imprisonment when her crack cocaine 
possession causes the death of her fetus.  
Finally, states could eventually restrict pregnant women’s “drink[ing, 
obesity,] or fail[ure] to follow doctors’ orders.”145  Therefore, pregnant 
women could potentially suffer deprivation of legal activities because 
legislatures assert an interest to protect fetal life.  Notably, state 
governments have been silent on whether women should abstain from 
prescription medication, rigorous sports, and daily activities in the interest 
of the fetus.146  However, many activities, such as exercise or prescription 
medicine, are in the best health interest of the mother, though states may 
prohibit the behaviors to save the life of the fetus.  If the states proscribe all 
maternal acts to protect fetal life, then states will violate Casey’s maternal 
life and health exceptions and will sacrifice women’s personhood rights at 
the expense of their fetuses.  Eventually, women may choose to abstain 
from motherhood to evade criminal sanctions, particularly women with 
addictions and mental health disorders.147  Essentially, these overbroad fetal 
homicide laws enable state legislatures to prevent the destruction of life by 
any means necessary at the expense of women’s reproductive agency.   
III. REDEFINING FETAL PERSONHOOD LAWS: BALANCING 
FETAL AND WOMEN’S INTERESTS 
If fetal pain and homicide laws continue in this manner, then the laws 
will continue to diminish women’s privacy rights merely because women 
choose to become pregnant or terminate pregnancies.  Therefore, if state 
legislatures determine to maintain fetal personhood measures, then they 
should amend them in order to respect women’s legal rights afforded under 
the Constitution.   
First, states should not regulate the pre-viable stages of pregnancy, as 
reaffirmed in Casey.  However, states may pass fetal protection measures in 
the post-viable stages and strictly construe them, so long as there are 
maternal health and life limitations to the fetal “personhood.”  As the fetal 
personhood laws stand currently, personhood seems resoundingly absolute 
as soon as the fetus is viable, and therefore, the mother’s privacy protection 
ceases to exist.  If states amend their current fetal personhood legislation to 
honor the post-viable health and life limitations reaffirmed in Casey, then 
the laws should pass constitutional muster.   
 
 145. Elliott, supra note 7. 
 146. Nora Christie Sandstad, Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment: A 
Feminist Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women’s Rights During Pregnancy, 26 
LAW & INEQ. 171, 176 (2008). 
 147. ACLU Asks Alabama Court to Protect the Rights of Pregnant Women, ACLU (July 
16, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/aclu-asks-alabama-court-protect-right 
s-pregnant-women; NAPW, supra note 73.  
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Second, the states should limit the breadth of regulations during the 
post-viable stages of pregnancy in considering the life, physical and mental 
health interests of the mother, as well, as relevant interests of the fetus.  In 
doing so, the narrowing of fetal “personhood” and subsequent maternal 
prosecutions will result.  As a recommendation, state governments should 
enact preventive measures.  States should fund local mental health 
programs and improve drug rehabilitation facilities.148  In doing so, state 
governments will foster the mother’s health interest, and in turn, the health 
of any future unborn children.  
Finally, states should cease imprisoning pregnant women for chemical 
endangerment of unborn children,149 unless the courts determine that the 
women are dangerous to the community under the respective states’ 
sentencing guidelines for relevant reasons.  As for women with existing 
children, states should refrain from separating mothers from their existing 
children as a mode of punishment for substance abuse during pregnancy.150  
Rather, separation should only occur if the pregnant mother is judicially 
determined as an unfit parent for her existing children.   
CONCLUSION 
Although states have an important interest in ensuring the health of 
their unborn citizens, the states also have a duty to respect the pre-existing 
rights of their born citizens.  Laws to protect fetal and maternal life can 
coexist.  Given that women have the right to terminate pregnancies prior to 
viability, narrowly tailoring existing legislation to refrain from the 
abridgement of reproductive privacy affords pregnant women their right to 
personhood.  Moreover, states must reexamine their current health policies 
as a means to protect fetal life in the post-viable stages of pregnancy, rather 
than enacting laws that eliminate women’s right to her personhood.  
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